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ARTICLES
The Flickering Lighthouse: Rethinking the British 
Judgement on Trianon*
Mark Cornwall
University of  Southampton 
J.M.Cornwall@soton.ac.uk
This article reassesses the official British discourse around the Treaty of  Trianon 
between 1919 and 1921. It studies a range of  colorful opinions for and against the 
treaty, why they emerged at particular times, and why some could prevail over others. 
Especially it focuses on the rationale of  those British parliamentarians or officials who 
spoke out against Trianon as being unjust to Hungary. These leading voices had varied 
backgrounds and prejudices, but they all had personal knowledge of  Hungary either 
before or after World War I. The article is divided into three time-periods, thereby 
highlighting the main shifts in British opinion that were often caused by geo-political 
changes in Hungary itself. While the key British decisions were taken in 1919 at the 
time of  the Paris Peace Conference, the vibrant and public British debate of  1920–
21 also had a long-term impact: it sustained Hungarian hopes and illusions about a 
future revision of  Trianon and about potential British sympathy. In fact, despite the 
strident voices heard during the British debate, the evidence suggests that there was 
more agreement among the British elite than some historians have suggested. By 1921, 
both opponents and supporters of  Trianon had reached a certain pragmatic consensus; 
they recognized both the faults and the fairness of  the peace settlement, but most now 
considered there could be no return to greater Hungary.
Keywords: Trianon, Great Britain, Paris Peace Settlement, revisionism
In one of  the compelling spy thrillers which the novelist Eric Ambler wrote in 
the late 1930s, his stateless hero, Josef  Vadassy, is a Hungarian living in France 
whose life has been dramatically changed thanks to the Treaty of  Trianon. It 
was typical of  Ambler to bring East-Central Europe into his thrillers, portraying 
the region for an English readership as somewhere both exotic and dangerous, 
where spies competed in the ideological battle of  fascism against communism. 
However, at the start of  Epitaph for a Spy, his Magyar protagonist makes a gross 
error. Explaining to the French police that he is from Szabadka, he gives the 
* I would like to thank Catherine Horel and Balázs Ablonczy for their help and advice in the original 
commissioning of  this article.
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date of  the Treaty of  Trianon not as 1920 but as 1919.1 The reason for the 
mistake is perhaps simple. Ambler had never been to Hungary, and for him 
the detail was irrelevant: it might well be jarring to a professional historian or 
any Hungarian reader, but few among his English audience in the 1930s would 
care, for “Trianon” was unknown to them. On the other hand, if  we wish to 
be generous to Ambler, we might suggest that Vadassy’s Magyar credentials 
were intact when he assumed that the Treaty of  Trianon was in place by 1919. 
Arguably, the crucial decisions about Hungary’s future borders were made in 
that year. What was left, in 1920, was a flood of  Hungarian protests, with some 
outspoken British voices of  support, but these voices had little effect on the 
signing and ratification of  the peace treaty.
Since 1920, many historians have suggested that Great Britain played a key 
role (perhaps the most vital among the Great Powers) in drawing up the treaty 
which shaped Hungary’s new borders and in stabilizing interwar Hungary. In 
the early 1920s, there was certainly much wishful thinking on the Hungarian 
side about Britain’s major influence, as well as Britain’s alleged historic sympathy 
for the Hungarian cause. Gyula Andrássy, for example, spoke in 1921 of  “how 
deeply disappointed he and others had been that England had deserted her old 
principles […] It was not the England that Hungary used to know that had 
made the peace.”2 This illusion of  special British sentiments towards Hungary 
always found some echoes in London too. In one British parliamentary debate 
in March 1920, for example, a garrulous politician who had recently visited 
Budapest pressed in exaggerated language for his country to intervene and help 
the Magyars: “It is Britain that is serving as a lighthouse for the whole world, and 
if  it flickers and goes out through our cowardice, half  the world will sink in the 
storm for lack of  guidance which this country alone can give.”3 
Yet the extent to which Great Britain really shaped the Hungarian settlement 
remains debatable. Even at the time, some establishment figures could not 
understand why the severe Trianon Treaty emerged as it did and why it had 
British approval. In April 1921, the treaty was debated in the House of  Lords, 
and Lord James Bryce commented, “No-one has carried any lamp into these 
dark corners in which the fate of  Hungary was decided.” A few months later, 
Lord Sydenham agreed. The Supreme Council’s decision concerning Hungary, 
he said, was “one of  the most extraordinary things of  which I know. Someday 
1 Ambler, Epitaph for a Spy, 9. 
2  Repington, After the War: A Diary, 163.
3  Captain Walter Elliott, quoted in The Hungarian Problem in the British Parliament, 50.
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it may be explained, and we shall know what was behind this determination, but 
at present it is unintelligible.”4 
Over the course of  the past forty years, several British and American 
historians have tried to answer these questions. One conclusion has been 
the predominant influence on the British Foreign Office of  “New Europe” 
adherents, especially the diplomats or “expert advisers” in Paris who shared 
the liberal-national outlook of  publicists like R. W. Seton-Watson. Seeking to 
carve out a territorial settlement on the basis (mainly) of  national ethnicity, these 
advisers’ role in 1919 was crucial in fixing Hungary’s borders to the advantage 
of  neighboring states like Czechoslovakia and Romania.5 Other historians have 
approached the British impact on Trianon more broadly, highlighting how and 
why the Anglo-Hungarian relationship dramatically improved between 1918 and 
1922 as Britain aspired to the restoration of  political and economic stability. 
According to Gábor Bátonyi, these years were a unique chapter in British interest 
in the region. From a position of  hostility or at least passivity towards Hungary 
in the first half  of  1919, there was then a “positive shift,” as the influence of  
the “New Europe” group declined and the stabilization of  Budapest became 
London’s predominant approach. Certainly, Britain was motivated by the desire 
to penetrate the Carpathian Basin economically, but perhaps as important was the 
sense that any long-term stability needed to be based on a just or fair settlement 
too. To some key British observers, the evidence increasingly suggested that the 
settlement was neither just nor fair to Hungary.6 
The following discussion, in the centenary year of  Trianon, seeks to rethink 
this shift in British official attitudes. It is primarily a study of  the conflicting 
British discourse about Hungary and Hungary’s borders, with a particular focus 
on when and why certain voices emerged and why some gained ascendency. 
The article is divided into three time periods of  the “Trianon settlement.” It 
also proceeds in reverse chronological order, working from 1921 back to 1918, 
in order to challenge a rather well-worn historical narrative and to highlight 
more clearly the trajectory of  opinion-formation. Through this approach to 
the sources, I reassess the continuities or breaks in British perceptions. I also 
4  Ibid., 214, 239.
5  See especially Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of  the Treaty of  Trianon,” and Hugh and 
Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of  a New Europe.
6  Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 4, 104. See also Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Establishment of  
the Horthy Regime”; and for a study emphasising Britain’s economic agenda in the region: Lojkó, Meddling 
in Middle Europe.
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show that the shifting Hungarian geo-political framework itself  determined how 
British observers responded in a positive or negative fashion. Indeed, to a large 
extent, London was always reacting to events on the ground in the Carpathian 
Basin, faits accomplis which could not be controlled and were usually only of  
modest concern to British official interests.
A Certain Consensus
The first period to consider, as an introduction, is spring 1921. After Hungary 
had ratified the peace treaty in November 1920, the focus in London was on 
British ratification in order to finish the peace process and allow reconstruction 
across Central Europe. This ratification occurred on May 5, 1921. The British 
parliamentary debates before this in the House of  Lords and the House of  
Commons reveal well the underlying perceptions and prejudices for and against 
the treaty. However, we should not simply note the individuals who took a stand 
as supporters or opponents of  Trianon, but also consider the ways in which the 
ideas of  both camps overlapped and converged. Ignác Romsics contends that 
by 1921, there was still no rapprochement between the “Foreign Office faction” 
and the “pro-Hungarian faction.”7 Yet as we shall see, this is only partially true. 
This notion, furthermore, implies a strict division in opinion when by 1921 the 
divide was actually rather artificial.
Certainly, there were basic disagreements in the parliamentary debates 
from March to May 1921, and these very much echoed the views expressed 
a year earlier (by many of  the same speakers). On the one hand, the British 
Coalition government in 1921 was pressing for treaty ratification. It claimed 
that the terms of  the treaty could not now be reopened for negotiation, as that 
would mean another peace conference. Instead, the famous “Millerand note” 
(sponsored by the British) suggested a way forward for some Hungarian border 
adjustments in the future.8 Fundamentally, however, speakers like Robert Cecil in 
the Commons and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, in the Lords justified the 
dismemberment of  historic Hungary as a process that was legitimate because of  
the ways in which the Magyar rulers had behaved before 1918. They had “grossly 
misgoverned the subject races.” Moreover, as Curzon put it, the Habsburg 
Monarchy had been “an artificial system” which had already begun to totter 
7  Romsics, The Dismantling of  Historic Hungary, 160.
8  See the speech of  Cecil Harmsworth (Under-Secretary of  Foreign Affairs) in the Commons on 20 
April 1921: The Hungarian Problem in the British Parliament, 113.
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before 1914: the war, which Budapest had helped cause, had simply given the 
system its coup de grâce.9 Following this line of  argument about Magyar misrule, 
the speakers also stressed that neither Britain nor the Paris Peace Conference 
had broken up Hungary. Rather, the peacemakers in 1919 had been faced with 
a fait accompli: at the end of  the war, Hungary’s “hostile races” had taken matters 
into their own hands and Hungary had “fallen into its component parts.”10 Great 
Britain’s role, with the other Powers, had been, according to Curzon, to find a 
compromise when settling the borders. This had been done as far as possible 
according to the Wilsonian principle of  self-determination. He maintained that 
the Magyar arguments had been given a fair hearing, and it was now time for 
Hungarians to put the past behind them: “the war may before long become no 
more than a painful dream.”11
Against this optimistic stance, the parliamentarians who spoke out against 
Trianon also appealed to the lessons of  history and then, especially, attacked the 
way in which the principle of  national self-determination had been adjudicated 
for Hungary. In both areas, however (history and self-determination), many “anti-
Trianon” speakers were prepared to accept some of  the government arguments: 
it was not a clear-cut division of  views, notwithstanding the contrary contentions 
of  later historians. Among the critics of  Trianon, two main loose groups can be 
identified. One represented new, younger politicians of  the parliamentary intake 
in the immediate wake of  the war. A second small group of  individuals stand out 
because of  their experience of  pre-1914 Europe, including having born personal 
witness to the relative stability of  the old Habsburg Empire. Let us turn to them 
first.
Most notable in this regard were Lord Bryce and Lord Newton (Thomas 
Legh). James Bryce had visited Transylvania as early as 1866. He had met József  
Eötvös in Budapest, and had come to the conclusion that Hungarians were “a 
courteous graceful people.”12 In a speech in the House of  Lords in May 1921, 
he disputed Magyar responsibility for the war and consistently stressed the 
sympathetic ties between Hungary and England, which included their alleged 
mutual crusade for “liberty.” Nevertheless, even Bryce was prepared to admit 
that “old Hungary” now had to bow before the “principle of  nationality.” 
Indeed, when travelling in northern Hungary in 1878, he himself  had seen how 
9  Ibid., 193ff: speech by Curzon.
10  Ibid., 108ff: Harmsworth speech.
11  Ibid., 198–99, 206. Also Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 117.
12  Fisher, James Bryce, vol. 1, 119–26.
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most of  the rural population was Slovak (he described them as “a less advanced 
and less politically active race” than the Magyars with whom they lived together 
as friends).13 Forty years later, he seems to have acknowledged reluctantly that 
much of  Slovakia wished to escape Magyar tutelage; he also conceded that the 
half  of  Transylvania with predominantly Romanian speakers might justifiably 
fall to Romania. What he disputed was the caricature of  pre-war Hungary 
that had made the country seem as bad as Prussia or czarist rule in Poland. 
In other words, he claimed Hungary was being treated with disproportionate 
vindictiveness – most glaringly in the unjust way that the borders had been 
decided in Paris. Bryce therefore conceded the relevance of  the “principle of  
nationality” to some extent, but he stressed that this principle had been violated, 
notably in the case of  Bratislava (Pozsony) and the Székely communities of  
Transylvania.14 His parliamentary performance was noticed by Budapest, and it 
cemented Bryce’s reputation as a champion of  the Magyars.15
Others who opposed the Treaty of  Trianon were less compromising than 
Bryce. Lord Newton questioned whether Slovaks or Croats really wanted to leave 
old Hungary; he concluded that the country should be treated with “humanity and 
justice,” as it was “the least guilty of  our ex-enemy powers.” A speedy ratification 
of  Trianon would at least allow the resumption of  correct Anglo-Hungarian 
relations.16 Newton’s forays on behalf  of  Hungary after the war were well known 
to the British Foreign Office, where one official thought him simply a dupe of  
Magyar propaganda, completely ignorant of  Hungarian history and policy. But 
how true was this? His growing connections with Central Europe are intriguing, 
for alongside Bryce, he was one of  Hungary’s most persistent supporters.17 
Before the war, Newton had been a professional diplomat, traveling widely and 
acquiring his own understanding of  the Habsburg “civilizing” mission in the 
Balkans. Apart from having seen Vienna and Budapest briefly in 1887, a visit to 
Bosnia three years later, mainly for trout fishing, left him singularly impressed: “I 
got the impression that [Bosnia] was well administered and that there was little 
to complain of  in Austrian rule.”18 
13  Bryce, Memories of  Travel, 102ff.
14  Bryce’s speech: The Hungarian Problem in the British Parliament, 213ff.
15  See the pamphlet commemorating the anniversary of  Bryce’s birth: Balogh, A magyar revízió angol 
előharcosa. 
16  Newton’s speech: The Hungarian Problem, 209, 212.
17  Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of  the Treaty of  Trianon,” 122. See also for Newton’s 
extra-parliamentary agitation: Barta, “Oxfordi Magyar Liga,” 370–76. 
18  Lord Newton, Retrospection, 44, 56–57.
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If  Newton’s Habsburg links before 1914 were always tentative, by the 
end of  the war, he was well-acquainted with several fellow-countrymen who 
were sympathetic to Hungary, including the future British High Commissioner 
Thomas Hohler, but also his own cousin, Admiral Ernest Troubridge, the 
British (Allied) commander on the Danube.19 Most significant was Newton’s 
underlying conservative stance against any radical peace settlement. He wished 
that the wartime belligerents had negotiated earlier for a stable peace and 
thereby prevented the destruction of  the old order. In this regard, his scorn for 
Hungary’s neighbors was quite clear, mirroring perhaps his contempt for what 
he termed the “ill-mannered” Irish politicians, who before 1914 had constantly 
made trouble for Great Britain. In short, at Trianon, Magyars had been handed 
over “like so many animals, to alien races of  an inferior civilization, in flat 
defiance of  the sacred principle of  Self-Determination.”20   
Bryce and Newton viewed Trianon partly through a pre-war lens, in other 
words a certain nostalgia for what they had observed of  the old Hungary, and 
this colored much of  their criticism of  the New Europe. However, while one 
historian has recently suggested that the critics’ “inveterate predilection for 
the old social and political order” was their sole common denominator, it was 
not in fact the only motivating force.21 A second group of  critics was formed 
by some younger politicians, newly elected to the House of  Commons, who 
had experienced the horrors of  a European war first hand and did not want 
hostilities to break out again. For them, the troubling aspect of  Trianon was not 
so much what was being lost (old Hungary, Anglo-Hungarian friendship), but 
rather the new nationalist instability which was already so evident. One speaker 
in the House of  Commons, a former naval officer, attacked the whole “disease 
of  nationality”; with an eye on other running nationalist sores, he claimed 
that little Ulsters or Alsace-Lorraines were now being created in Slovakia and 
Transylvania.22 
Among those who attacked Trianon, a Scottish Conservative, Captain Walter 
Elliott, was the most vociferous of  this new parliamentary intake. According to 
one witness, as a former wartime doctor and wounded soldier, Elliott had “a wide 
19  Ibid., 130, 235. For Troubridge, see Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 104. While pro-Serbian, 
Troubridge clearly approached Hungary with concerns about Romanian aggression in the region; for the 
background to his stance, see Šarenac, The Forgotten Admiral.
20  Buday, Dismembered Hungary, vii (introduction by Newton). See also Retrospection, 262–63, and Newton’s 
view of  “ill-educated and ill-mannered” Irish MPs, ibid., 99. 
21  Bakić, Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe, 10.
22  Speech of  Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Kenworthy: The Hungarian Problem, 130–31.
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erudition and a fascinating capacity for conversation.” But in debate, “he was too 
diffuse with an argument insufficiently concentrated, often a fault in those who 
delight others and themselves delight in conversation.”23 Nevertheless, the new 
parliamentarian immediately made a stir with his oratory, and his many qualities 
led him to a seat in the British cabinet in the 1930s. His stance on Trianon in 
1921 can be explained in a number of  ways. As a maverick who tended to shirk 
from any party label, he felt mistrustful of  the politicians who had produced 
the postwar chaos. He himself, with one eye on the Irish and Scottish problems, 
inclined towards a “national” style for British politics, where in his perception 
unity should predominate over fragmentation.24 
He approached Hungary with the same pragmatism, and here two personal 
experiences of  unabashed nationalism shaped his outlook. First, in the summer 
of  1919, he had decided to explore the territory of  the fallen Habsburg Monarchy. 
He had motored along the Dalmatian coast (presumably encountering Italian-
Croatian nationalist rivalry) and had then visited Budapest, observing the 
chaotic scenes there precisely in the wake of  the regime of  Béla Kun. While his 
biographer lightly dismisses these “trivial tales of  excursions,”25 for Walter Elliott 
they were crucial in clarifying his abhorrence of  the nationalist forces which, 
he felt, had caused the war and then decimated Hungary and the Monarchy. 
Secondly, this experience reinforced the views he had long held from his native 
Scotland. Before the war, the liberal commentator “Scotus Viator” (R. W. Seton-
Watson) had proposed Scotland-in-Britain as the ideal federal model for national 
autonomy in Hungary.26 Elliott, though greatly loyal to Scotland, was equally 
averse to what he viewed as the whining criticisms of  Scottish nationalists, and 
he drew his own lessons from that in the interwar world. In April 1921, in the 
parliamentary debate on Trianon Hungary, he savaged the “wicked policy of  
self-determination,” which had swept away a thousand-year-old entity. He then 
suggested a vivid comparison. If  the Serb “immigrants” into southern Hungary 
could now leave the country and take territory with them, it would be like Belgian 
23  Mosley, My Life, 273. According to Cuthbert Headlam, another Conservative politician, Elliott was 
“extremely able and has the gift of  making people believe that he is even more able than he actually is.” Ball, 
Parliament and Politics in the Age of  Baldwin and Macdonald, 272.
24  Coote, A Companion of  Honour, 43, 48, 71; Searle, Country before Party, 118. 
25  Coote, A Companion of  Honour, 53–57.
26  On Seton-Watson, see Cornwall, “Robert William Seton-Watson és a kései Habsburg Birodalom,” 
327–49. Also, for a personal view: Seton-Watson, “R. W. Seton-Watson and the Trianon Settlement,” 43–53.
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wartime refugees suddenly annexing the English coastal town of  Bournemouth: 
what ingratitude that would signify to their host nation!27
Elliott took the most radical stance in this parliament, but in the long debates 
of  1921 there was actually some consensus that Trianon should now be ratified 
to achieve stability and perhaps also to further British influence in the region. The 
government side was conceding that the Hungarian settlement had been a most 
difficult subject: it was already criticizing the reparations imposed on Hungary as 
unrealistic and implying that small border corrections might be possible. In turn, 
the “anti-Trianon camp” was composed of  men who professed to know about 
Hungary from personal experience, and they shared a common abhorrence of  
the nationalist New Europe which had replaced pre-war “stability.” But even 
here, there were some surprising concessions and some readiness to accept a 
break with the old Hungary. They agreed that previous Magyar rule over greater 
Hungary had indeed caused unrest and dissatisfaction; they also felt that it might 
be justifiable to implement the principle of  national self-determination across 
the region. The big question for them was whether that principle had been 
carried out fairly, or whether Trianon contained fresh grievances which might 
be the seeds of  a future European war. Behind the parliamentary vote in favor 
of  treaty ratification on May 5, 1921, there was therefore a latent consensus that 
some future adjustments to Trianon could be necessary, while at the same time, 
the basic Hungarian settlement should be accepted.
The Debate at Its Height
The second phase to consider is from October 1919 until the signature of  the 
Trianon Treaty in June 1920. These were critical months, when British interest 
in Hungary was at its height for many reasons. It was a time when, with the rise 
of  the Horthy regime, there were many new British representatives in Hungary, 
including a High Commissioner, Thomas Hohler, and a special emissary from 
the Peace Conference, George Clerk (arriving in October 1919). Meanwhile, 
in Paris, Hungary’s treaty was finally being properly scrutinized. Count Albert 
Apponyi was able to submit the Hungarian arguments and objections, and in 
February–March 1920, the “Big Three” of  Britain, France, and Italy disputed at 
least the viability of  the proposed Hungarian borders.28 The winter of  1919–20 
27  Coote, A Companion of  Honour, 77; and The Hungarian Problem, 156ff.
28  For a still useful older history of  this subject, see Deák, Hungary at the Peace Conference.
HHR_2020-1_KÖNYV.indb   11 7/28/2020   9:10:50 AM
12
Hungarian Historical Review 9,  no. 1  (2020): 3–25
produced a heightened cacophony of  British voices for and against the peace 
terms. In the end, it was the Foreign Office loudspeaker which would triumph, 
because its “experts,” like Allen Leeper, were deferred to as the key policymakers. 
They were already insisting that Hungary’s frontiers had been permanently fixed, 
all the more so, as precisely that message had been sent to the surrounding states 
in June 1919. 
The authority of  a contrary set of  British opinions owed much to the fact 
that they came from new men on the spot, located on Hungarian territory from 
the summer of  1919 due to London’s concern about Romanian military excesses. 
Notable were those responsible to the Admiralty or the War Office: particularly 
Admiral Troubridge, who in August moved the headquarters of  the Allied 
Danube Command to Budapest, and Reginald Gorton, who was sent as the 
British representative on an Inter-Allied Military Commission.29 These critical 
voices were then echoed in the British parliament by Bryce and others. The 
question arises whether, if  this disparate Magyarophile camp had been more 
coordinated, it could have challenged the “Foreign Office” clique at this crucial 
stage. Rumors circulated at the time that support for Hungary was mounting. 
But as Seton-Watson (correctly) reassured the Czechoslovak President Tomáš 
Masaryk in March 1920, people like Troubridge and Newton did not really 
represent British policy: 
They are individuals who have been caught up in certain currents and 
are busily engaged in urging a policy of  their own upon our government, 
but not with success […] I can find no evidence of  a serious nature to 
suggest that the Magyar intrigues have got any hold here in London.30 
Indeed, the challenge for any champions of  Hungary’s cause was tremendous, 
because of  the Foreign Office “insider advantage” and the prejudices still 
circulating about Hungary as a German or Bolshevik ally, not to mention the 
concerted hostile stance of  Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, in late 1919, British officials in Budapest began to request 
a sympathetic hearing for Hungary in London. They did so partly because 
the new Horthy regime seemed accommodating, even moderate, and it thus 
offered a contrast with continued stories of  Romanian “atrocities” in occupied 
29  Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 103–6; Lojkó, Meddling in Middle Europe, 15: Troubridge “retained 
more leverage over the military situation than any other Allied commander.”
30  Bakić, Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe, 18.
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Transylvania or the Yugoslav refusal to withdraw from the region around the 
city of  Pécs. The British were also faced for the first time with an onslaught of  
Magyar petitions against the treaty, coupled with the widespread expectation 
that England at least would give Hungary a “fair hearing.” Most striking were 
the reports sent to Paris by Sir George Clerk and members of  his mission, for 
they, after all, were Allied delegates whose designated role was to bring stability 
to Hungary (ensuring that a stable government was established and Romanian 
troops were evacuated from the country). One member of  Clerk’s mission, 
for instance, reported to London about a tour of  the truncated country: “The 
universal feeling throughout is that the old boundaries must be restored by 
some means or other and Roumania made to disgorge what she has taken.”31 
Another, Percy Loraine, agreed after receiving a mass of  petitions that there 
was widespread opposition to many of  the suggested amputations. The loss 
of  Croatia was accepted, but not Slovakia (where it was felt the conference had 
been duped by the Czechs) and especially not Transylvania.32 
On the subject of  Transylvania, Clerk himself  felt that, because of  
the harshness of  the Romanian invaders, a special Inter-Allied commission 
should be sent there. During the war, Clerk had been strongly influenced by 
the “nationality principle” in the British Foreign Office. But after arriving in 
Budapest, he quickly agreed with his Magyar hosts, who stressed that the “new 
rulers” in occupied Hungarian territory were “learners in the art of  government” 
and of  a “lower civilization.” One petition submitted to Clerk by the Hungarian 
Technical University pressed for territorial integrity, arguing that “Hungary 
has raised culture to a high level on its natural geographical territory […] On 
mutilated territory Hungary would be unable to further fulfil this vocation!”33 
Clerk concluded that, while the new states needed firm supervision and guidance 
from the West, Hungary itself, on the basis of  what he had observed, could be 
expected to be sensible: “They realize, I think, the broad justice of  the inclusion 
of  peoples of  one common stock in one State, but they feel that the Allies have 
[…] only heard one side of  the case and have naturally given the benefit to those 
who fought on their side.” He warned against the Allies sowing the seeds of  
future conflicts.34
31  TNA, FO 371/3518, D.C. Campbell to Leeper (private letter), 29 December 1919.
32  TNA, FO 608/17, Percy Loraine to Leeper, 22 November 1919 enclosing ten petitions.
33  TNA, FO 608/17/20922, Clerk to FO sending petition, 2 December 1919. 
34  Ibid., Clerk report to Supreme Council, 29 November 1919. 
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These reports usually found an unsympathetic ear at the Foreign Office, as 
they were sent first to Allen Leeper or Eyre Crowe (permanent secretary), key 
figures on the territorial committees of  the Peace Conference, and they could 
easily be deflected.35 Both Leeper and Crowe were now irritated at Romania’s 
refusal to withdraw to the demarcation lines and were even prepared to send 
an Allied commission to investigate. But they did not want to reopen au fond 
the nationality questions, which their committees had settled in May 1919. 
Thus, when in November they were sent a memorandum from the Hungarian 
government about injustices in Slovakia, both responded negatively. Leeper 
noted that the memorandum was exaggerated and not worth passing on to 
the Supreme Council. Crowe remarked simply, “Better leave it alone. These 
controversies lead to no practical results.”36
Despite this, there is good evidence to suggest that by early 1920, the mood 
in the Foreign Office was indeed slowly shifting away from the Leeper-Crowe 
perspective towards a more positive engagement with Hungary’s complaints. 
One reason was the replacement as foreign secretary of  Arthur Balfour, who fully 
supported Trianon and had been a member of  the Peace Conference, by Lord 
Curzon, who seemed to have less blatant sympathy for Hungary’s neighbors.37 
Curzon’s introduction to the Central European situation also coincided with the 
Clerk mission to Budapest, which, as Gábor Bátonyi suggests, started something 
of  a special Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the winter of  1919–20. In addition 
to a Hungarian Delegation now being invited to Paris, another result of  Clerk’s 
mission was the appointment of  a British High Commissioner to Hungary. From 
January 1920, Sir Thomas Hohler was to be an “extraordinarily sympathetic and 
totally uncritical minister” in Budapest, partly due to his friendship with Regent 
Miklós Horthy in prewar Constantinople.38 
Precisely at the time when the Hungarian delegation under Apponyi was 
putting its case in Paris in early 1920, Hohler sent several reports to the Foreign 
Office expounding the Hungarian case. He passed on the views of  Horthy and 
Apponyi that, whatever treaty was signed, the state would eventually be restored 
“to its old historic limits.” Here, there was strong evidence that the Magyar 
35  For the impact of  Crowe and Leeper on these committees (which effectively delimited the Hungarian 
borders), see Romsics, The Dismantling of  Historic Hungary, 76–85.
36  TNA, FO 608/17, Clerk to Crowe, 6 November 1919, with minutes by Leeper and Crowe. 
37  For alarming rumours that Curzon might be pro-Magyar, see Seton-Watsons, The Making of  a New 
Europe, 401–2.
38  Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 289; Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 114 (for the Clerk mission, 
107–14).
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leadership hoped especially for British support, all the more so after January 16, 
when both Curzon and Prime Minister David Lloyd George had shown interest 
in Apponyi’s ethnic map of  Hungary.39 Hohler strongly promoted the idea that 
Britain should support Hungary as a “friendly buffer state” in the region, and he 
asked Curzon to consider a fresh presentation by Apponyi in Paris. “The present 
arrangements,” he concluded on February 1, “appear to be faulty and incapable 
of  standing the test of  time.” The treaty was contrary to Wilson’s principle of  
national self-determination and therefore constituted “an immediate menace to 
the peace of  Europe.”40
It is of  course tempting to suggest that Hohler was simply hoodwinked 
by Magyar propaganda, but like Clerk, he was at least reporting the protests 
and mood he observed on the spot. These critical winter months require more 
research to illuminate in detail the close interaction and even confluence of  
Anglo-Hungarian arguments and networking. Britain was keenly aware at this 
time that the French too were vying for influence over Hungary; this has been 
well documented by historians.41 Budapest in turn was taking new initiatives to 
highlight in London the benefits of  Britain securing influence in the region. For 
it was precisely now that Miklós Bánffy was sent by the Hungarian government 
to London to make contact with politicians, including Curzon and Asquith. 
According to his memoirs, Bánffy had some success after “endless hard 
work, attention to detail and, above all, tact.”42 He found willing ears in Bryce, 
Cecil, and Newton, but also among church leaders, particularly Unitarians and 
Presbyterians alarmed at Romanian treatment of  Transylvanian Protestants, and 
Jewish leaders like Lucien Wolf, who were anxious about minority rights.43  
Bánffy’s path into the corridors of  power was also considerably eased 
through the “invaluable help” of  the Hungarian-born Rozsika Wertheimstein, 
the wife of  Charles Rothschild. Having met the Rothschild heir, a serious 
conservationist, in 1906 when he was exploring the Carpathian mountains, 
39  Deák, Hungary and the Peace Conference, 207–11; Romsics, The Dismantling of  Historic Hungary, 125–28.
40  TNA, FO 371/3518, Hohler to Curzon, 1 February 1920; and Hohler to Curzon, 28 January 1920 
(quoting Apponyi).
41  See for example, Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 120ff; and the detailed study of  Mária Ormos, 
From Padua to the Trianon. 
42  Bánffy, The Phoenix Land, 199–201; Romsics, The Dismantling of  Historic Hungary, 129–30. Something 
of  Bánffy’s network in Britain is also clear from the diary of  the Hungarian peace delegation kept by Count 
István Csáky: see Deák, Ujváry, Pièces et documents relatifs aux rapports internationaux, Appendix 1.
43  For a discussion of  Presbyterian links to Magyar Protestant churches, see Zsuppán, “Hungarian 
Treaty Revision,” 153–60.
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the flamboyant Rozsika had moved to England, but she always kept firm ties 
with her family in Hungary. There, in December 1918, she had led a campaign 
publicizing the miserable plight of  Hungarian children; in interwar Britain, she 
knew Magyarophiles like Lord Newton, and she actively promoted financial aid 
to Hungary from Rothschild resources.44 “In her house,” wrote Bánffy, “I almost 
felt I was breathing the air of  my own home; and the lion’s share in any success 
I may have achieved in my mission was thanks to her advice and help and to her 
mediation on my behalf.”45    
In the spring of  1920, indirectly through Rozsika Rothschild and other 
social contacts nurtured by Bánffy, vigorous debates began in the British 
parliament. Bryce, Newton, and others, having urged the Hungarians to delay 
finalizing the treaty as long as possible, echoed the language of  Budapest 
when they spoke in the House of  Lords: namely, that Hungary was pro-
British and had been against the war, and that “civilised human beings” were 
now being handed over like cattle to the successor states.46 According to 
Newton, Hungary was like a man “who has had a paralytic stroke and is being 
constantly kicked and cuffed by his former associates and dependents.”47 
Another Bánffy target, Lord John Montagu of  Beaulieu, agreed, contending 
that the treaty was simply “insane and unworkable.” If  Montagu’s own 
passion for motoring and modern transport perhaps naturally inclined him 
to criticize the new fragmented communications network in the Carpathian 
Basin, he had also just visited Budapest. There, he had honed some pro-
Hungarian views when staying with his friend, Admiral Troubridge. He 
concluded that “that country had suffered unfairly in the breaking up of  the 
old Austro-Hungarian Empire after the war.”48  
Yet this fresh British political momentum of  early 1920 also owed much 
to news reaching London about Romanian misrule in Transylvania and rumors 
about a White Terror (which a delegation from the Labour Party and the British 
trade unions would soon investigate). Some eccentric Conservative politicians 
were encouraged to support the Horthy regime precisely because of  Labour 
opposition to it. Thus, in one House of  Commons debate, Walter Elliott pointed 
44  Rothschild, Dear Lord Rothschild, 94–97, 244. Rozsika notably was also a life-long friend of  Count Pál 
Teleki.
45  Bánffy, The Phoenix Land, 201.
46  Speech of  Newton, 30 March 1920: The Hungarian Problem, 54.
47  Ibid., 57.
48  Speech of  Montagu: ibid., 66. See also Troubridge, Marshall, John Lord Montagu of  Beaulieu, 215, 256. 
In 1900 Montagu had been the first MP to drive a car into the British Houses of  Parliament.
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out the prejudices of  the left-wing press as he went on to condemn the treaty. 
Describing the new Slovakia as a “banana-shaped country,” he ridiculed the 
proposed borders: “The Peace Conference is full of  very great and important 
gentlemen, but they cannot make rivers run sideways across mountains, because 
they run downhill and not across.” In his view, the iron rules of  geography could 
not be changed.49
The Government responded to these criticisms in March 1920 by noting 
that the expert territorial committees had worked very diligently in 1919, that 
there was no bias, and that Hungary in January 1920 had had ample time to 
put its case to the Peace Conference. The critics rightly found this line of  
defense disingenuous. In fact, it did obscure the differences of  opinion that 
had begun to appear at the Foreign Office. On February 10 in response to 
Hohler’s reports, Curzon noted that he did not really know why the conference 
had decided on the proposed borders for Hungary. Allen Leeper, however, 
quickly jumped in to reject Hohler’s arguments. He stressed that the territorial 
committees had followed the ethnic principle as far as possible (except in 
Slovakia and Transylvania, where transport links were necessary). And since the 
new countries had been told by Britain that this was the final settlement (and in 
the meantime had signed their peace treaties), future stability was in danger if  
everything were to be reconsidered. This would simply encourage Hungary to 
resist, and would constitute a betrayal of  the recognition which Britain had given 
to Czechoslovakia and the other neighboring states.50
Curzon’s behavior a few weeks later suggests that he was not wholly 
convinced by this argument, or he felt at least that the Hungarian question still 
needed to be revisited. Lloyd George similarly was urging France and Italy that 
Europe would have no peace if  the Hungarian case were not fully scrutinized. A 
key reason for this governmental shift was that, in early 1920, new opinions had 
surfaced at the Foreign Office, stemming either directly from British supporters 
or indirectly from Magyar campaigners in Britain. The Hungarian settlement 
was suddenly (for the first time) a real focus of  public attention.
Nevertheless, Curzon continued to listen to the “expert” Allen Leeper, 
who stridently expounded his opposition to Hungary’s “anachronistic” 
arguments. The result was that, during a meeting of  Allied foreign ministers 
in London on March 8, the idea of  making any changes to the treaty was 
49  The Hungarian Problem, 47. Elliott would repeat this in April 1921: ibid., 161.
50  TNA, FO 371/3518, Hohler to Curzon, 1 February 1920: minutes by Curzon and Leeper (11 
February 1920).
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rejected.51 The overriding argument, as detailed in writing by Leeper, was 
that Hungary’s borders must be settled quickly and short-term stability must 
be prioritized over any long-term dangers. Thus, in 1920, the very idea of  
reopening the treaty was construed as a major obstacle. But there was a small 
“carrot” which the Powers (especially Britain) still seemed to be offering 
Budapest and which the Hungarians seemed grudgingly to accept when they 
signed the Treaty of  Trianon (June 6). This was the so-called Millerand note, 
which was sent to Hungary on May 6 under the signature of  the new French 
premier, Alexandre Millerand. While rejecting the Hungarian Delegation’s 
demand for plebiscites in contested areas, the note suggested that if  Hungary 
had objections to the treaty, it might eventually appeal to the League of  
Nations over specific border rectifications. It was a glimmer of  light that 
would sustain Hungarian revisionist hopes thereafter, just as the Anglo-
Hungarian flirtation of  winter 1920 had substantially prepared the ground.
Fixing the Trianon Framework
As we have seen, by 1921 there was growing British official consensus over 
Hungary, a realization that the new normality of  Trianon should be accepted. In 
1920, however, the clash of  opinions was only too evident, for in the struggle 
for stability in the region, fresh voices had challenged the official line favoring 
Czechoslovakia and Romania and had questioned what the new Hungarian 
frontiers might mean for Central Europe. If  we now turn briefly to 1918–1919, 
the third and best documented phase, this was of  course the period when the 
Trianon framework, which later proved so hard to dismantle, was firmly set in 
place. First, in the faits accomplis of  late 1918, the Allies had allowed the successor 
states to invade greater Hungary and stay there. Second, the Peace Conference’s 
territorial committees, guided by the principle of  national self-determination, 
scrutinized the Hungarian frontiers and had them approved without debate by 
the Council of  Ten on May 12, 1919. 
Historians have examined much of  this period in depth, showing that 
Lloyd George was an occasional spokesman for Magyar interests (for example 
in his Fontainebleau Memorandum of  March 25, in which he warned about a 
draconian peace which could ferment Hungarian irredentism). On April 30, he 
51  Romsics, The Dismantling of  Historic Hungary, 134–37. Romsics suggests that Curzon persuaded Lloyd 
George to accept the resolution of  8 March 1920.
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proposed to the Council of  Four that Hungary should be invited to Paris to 
discuss the peace terms. However, generally he was not interested or engaged 
enough to push his concerns in the face of  the Foreign Office, which dominated 
in Paris and consistently favored the Czechoslovak and Romanian states.52 It 
is usually noted that Harold Nicolson, Crowe, and Leeper played key roles on 
the territorial committees, siding with France and defining Hungary’s ethnic 
borders in the narrowest sense possible; in addition, they focused on making 
the surrounding states economically viable. What is often ignored is the historic 
continuity in official British thinking: namely, Hungary was consistently seen as a 
destabilizing element in Central Europe. As I have shown elsewhere, the Foreign 
Office before World War I had summed up the “chauvinistic” Magyar regime as 
a key source of  instability and had anticipated, even before Seton-Watson began 
to gain more influence in 1917, that Hungary would have to be restructured in 
some way.53 In the wartime British press, diverse opinions were ventilated for 
and against Hungary, but in Whitehall, a viewpoint sharply critical of  Budapest 
was long established.54 
During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, this trend persisted. The 
Foreign Office believed that the old Magyar regime had fought to the bitter 
end and therefore deserved punishment, while the country’s new rulers 
(or were they really so new?) seemed in their petitions to the West far too 
obsessed with Hungary’s territorial integrity. Moreover, any small sympathy for 
Hungary’s aspirations was weakened by the reign of  Béla Kun, which caused 
major headaches for the peacemakers. As Crowe noted on one occasion, the 
Allied plan in Central Europe was “to set up free and independent states as a 
counterbalance to a German-Bolshevik combination.”55 Hungary, having been 
Germany’s staunch wartime ally, could now for four months be portrayed as a 
virulent Bolshevik threat. In both cases (whether Hungary was a German ally 
or a hotbed of  Bolshevism), it was natural to them in the regional danger by 
affirming tighter frontiers. During the key months of  the Peace Conference, 
these concerns formed a steady backdrop to British official thinking, especially 
52  See for example ibid., 76–102. An older narrative covering Anglo-Hungarian relations in 1918–19 is 
Ardaj, Térkép, csata után.
53  Cornwall, “Great Britain and the Splintering.” See also the seminal work of  Géza Jeszenszky, Az 
elveszett presztízs. 
54  For a clash over Hungary in the British press, see Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the 
First World War.
55  TNA, FO 608/13, Seton-Watson to Balfour (telegram), 9 June 1919: minute by Crowe, 11 June 1919.
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when Leeper and others suggested that Magyar nationalism and Bolshevism 
went hand in hand as a combined threat to Central Europe.56 
Only a few British observers (apart from Lloyd George) started to become 
concerned about the future of  Hungary. Ironically, Seton-Watson was one of  
them. In May 1919, having witnessed the chaos there, he wrote, “Little as I love 
the Magyars or regret the fate they have brought on themselves, I do not wish to 
see them destroyed altogether.”57 Despite this, like most British officials in Paris 
or London, Seton-Watson was not questioning the notion that greater Hungary 
needed to be dismembered. What was vital was to ensure stability and security 
for the New Europe; the new successor states were the allies who needed to 
keep order (since Britain itself  could not contribute any troops). Only in the last 
months of  1919 was a new Hungarian regime established which tried to present 
itself  to Britain as a respectable force for regional stability and order. As we have 
seen, this prompted new forms of  support for the Hungarian cause and a new 
British questioning of  the peace settlement.
Conclusion
Of  course, the British debate on Trianon did not end in 1921. Fresh controversy 
was stirred through the press campaign of  Viscount Rothermere six years later.58 
During the three phases of  the creation of  Trianon, it is clear that the Hungarian 
treaty really became a subject for public discourse in Britain only from late 
1919. Until then, the British officials who debated it were working in private on 
the territorial committees of  the Paris Peace Conference. They were chained 
above all closely to the “nationality policy,” which Britain in mid-1918 had semi-
officially adopted towards the Habsburg Monarchy.59
In its essence, that vision of  a New Europe always had an anti-Hungarian 
streak based on the firm conviction that the Magyar regime in the old Monarchy 
had been oppressive and that similar nationalistic chauvinists were still in control 
of  Hungary. It was only in 1920 that the idealistic crusade began to weaken, 
when the reality of  the New Europe became clearer, and when new British 
56  For instance, TNA, FO 608/13/13266, Leeper’s minute, 23 June 1919: “Magyar Bolsheviks and 
Nationalists have been accomplices on many occasions lately.” 
57  TNA, FO 608/12, Seton-Watson to Headlam-Morley (private letter), 26 May 1919; also reproduced 
in Lojkó, British Policy on Hungary, 202–5. 
58  As an introduction to this, see Romsics, “Hungary’s Place in the Sun.”
59  For the shift in British policy towards Austria-Hungary, see Cornwall, The Undermining of  Austria-
Hungary, chapter 6; and Calder, Britain and the Origins of  the New Europe 1914–1918. 
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voices sprang up to counter Leeper or Seton-Watson. Particularly, some new 
Magyarophiles emerged in the British parliament to paint a different version of  
modern Hungarian history and even to question the ideal of  self-determination. 
Among these critics, there was a strong sense that an alternative moral dimension 
to the ongoing Hungarian crisis existed, one which any “fair-minded person” 
would surely support.60 
Indeed, this early British debate over the morality of  Trianon had some 
parallels with a later moral contestation over Central European grievances 
during the Sudeten crisis of  1938. In the early interwar years, the matter of  
Czechoslovakia’s German minority had received little British attention, or at least 
justice and morality were mainly felt to be on the Czech side against anything 
German. By 1936, however, many British observers were inclining towards a 
moral stance in favor of  Sudeten German complaints about discrimination. 
They did so on the basis of  the belief  that firm evidence existed to support those 
grievances; that notion was strengthened by their own personal observations 
in Czechoslovakia and by the avid campaigning in Britain of  Sudeten German 
political activists.61 In both cases (the Hungarian in 1920 and the Sudeten in 
1938), there was a moral underpinning to the cause that strengthened the 
arguments of  Britons who primarily feared regional chaos or even a new war 
if  the respective grievances were not addressed. The difference in 1938 was 
that the British government was now prepared to back a (Sudeten) cause, which 
would reverse the peace settlement of  1919. It viewed that course as both 
moral and practical for British interests. This, in turn, raised again the matter of  
territorial revisionism more broadly. Recent research has shown how, parallel to 
the Sudeten crisis, British equivocation about Trianon naturally resurfaced; in 
the late 1930s, Anglo-Hungarian relations began to matter again, since key pillars 
of  the New Europe were starting to crumble.62 
Yet early 1920, when the Hungarians had first put their case to the Allies 
in Paris, was the key time when they had looked to the British lighthouse for 
guidance and aid. New feelers were then sent out from Budapest to sympathetic 
60  See The Hungarian Problem, 9.
61  For a new take on the Sudeten problem in British thinking, see Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, chapters 
8–9; for the diplomacy, see Novotný, The British Legation in Prague.
62  See the recent revisionist work of  András Becker: “The Dynamics of  British Official Policy towards 
Hungarian Revisionism, 1938–39; “British Diplomacy, Propaganda and War Strategy and the Hungarian-
Romanian Dispute over Transylvania in 1939-40.” These stem from Becker’s PhD thesis: The Problem of  
Hungarian Borders and Minorities in British Foreign Political Thought 1936–1941 (University of  Southampton, 
2014).
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supporters in Britain. In response, the lighthouse sent back some reassuring 
messages, but it remained flickering and was never consistent. On the one hand, 
the British establishment was naturally conservative, wishing to conclude the 
Hungarian treaty as quickly as possible, gain economic advantages, and ensure 
regional stability. On the other, many British politicians who were now studying 
the subject for the first time began to feel uneasy about what had occurred. 
At most, they could suggest to Budapest that the Trianon borders might be 
adjusted in the future, if  only Hungary would behave responsibly and peacefully 
on the European stage. By 1921, a certain consensus prevailed across the British 
political spectrum that the basics of  Trianon were now permanent. It is worth 
emphasizing, especially in this centenary year of  Trianon, that even friends of  
Hungary like Lord Bryce or Walter Elliott were not advocating a crusade to 
overturn the new frontiers. Theirs was a pragmatic approach: to complain about 
Trianon Hungary, but largely to accept it despite its imperfections: there could 
be no restoration of  greater Hungary.
The next twenty years saw the Trianon grievance occasionally surfacing in 
Britain and stirring public awareness. Among those who harped on the subject 
were mavericks like Rothermere or idealists like Lord Newton. For Newton, 
Hungary had become a lasting passion, a new chapter in his life, and one that 
brought him into the company of  the “most charming” Rozsika Rothschild. He 
continued to visit the region (for instance Transylvania in late 1921) and advised 
the Hungarians to be patient: they should “strive to create a homogeneous state, 
which will serve as an enviable model to their neighbors and do more towards 
recovering Hungarian Irredenta than anything else.”63 
For others who heard the word “Trianon” in the late 1930s, it surely sparked 
anxious thoughts. Thus, for the novelist Eric Ambler in 1938, Trianon was above 
all useful as a small device to enhance the drama and credibility of  his espionage 
thriller. His Magyar protagonist, Vadassy, might well personify one of  the sad 
injustices of  Trianon for those who were well-informed. But for most British 
readers, he probably evoked hazy ideas of  chaos in nationalist Eastern Europe in 
the aftermath of  a cataclysmic war. In their minds, the old Hungarian grievances 
were just some of  the many that seemed to be resurfacing in 1938, edging Britain 
and Europe towards a new period of  war and mass death.    
63  Newton, in Buday, Dismembered Hungary, xiv. See also Rothschild, Dear Lord Rothschild, 18; Zsuppán, 
“Hungarian Treaty Revision,” 155.
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The National Archives, London (TNA) 
 Foreign Office files (FO)
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